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A FORMALIST THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW ADJUDICATION
Felipe Jiménez *
Abstract
Formalism has a bad name. It is often seen as a naïve and
unsophisticated approach to the adjudication of legal disputes. This
negative view of formalism is widespread in American legal culture and
has been particularly influential in contract law. This Article challenges
this prevailing view and argues that a formalist theory of adjudication is
the best approach to resolve contractual disputes.
The argument of this Article starts from the assumption that contract
law is not morally justified because of its enforcement of promissory rights
or some other dimension of interpersonal morality. Instead, like
contemporary law and economics, this Article assumes as its starting point
that the law of contracts is an instrumentally justified legal institution (i.e.,
an institution justified because of its valuable social consequences).
Starting from this assumption, this Article asks what approach to the
adjudication of contractual disputes facilitates the achievement of
contract law’s instrumental goals. Against the common assumption, the
answer is that a formalist approach—the specific contours of which are
set out below—would be instrumentally best. This is because formalism,
with its commitment to an ex-post, rule-bound, doctrinalist, and modest
approach to legal adjudication, has important instrumental benefits.
Formalism contributes to simple, generalizable, and cost-effective
decision-making; it is consistent with the institutional competence of
courts; reduces the risks and overall costs of legal mistakes; and increases
predictability, protecting contractual parties’ legitimate expectations.
Moreover, formalism is an adequate means to deal with value pluralism
and is consistent with the main values served by the law of contracts, such
as autonomy and efficiency.
Thus, encouraging judges to make socially optimal decisions in
contractual disputes might not be the optimal strategy. The overall
socially optimal outcome might, instead, be achieved through a decision
procedure that directs judges to decide by applying pre-existing doctrine
and expanding it incrementally. If that is the case, then, despite their
disagreement about contract law’s foundations, instrumentalist and
*
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formalist theorists might agree about the narrower question of how judges
should decide contractual disputes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Formalism “has a bad name.”1 The label invites associations with the
exploitation of the weak by powerful commercial interests,2 as well as with a naïve
and mythological view of legal institutions.3 In contract law, specifically, formalism
has been commonly seen as a set of “ivory tower abstraction[s]”4 and “mystical
absolute[s].”5 Its defenders feel compelled to explain why it is not a “[s]tupid
[t]hing.”6
Thus, labeling something—a form of legal reasoning, a theory of adjudication,
an approach to statutory interpretation, or an interpretive account of the law—as
formalistic is a dismissive gesture, a warning sign that tells us we are better off not
wasting our time. As the saying goes, at least in American legal academia, “we are
all realists now,”7 and an important part of being a realist is thinking that legal
materials do not determine case outcomes. The actual work, or so we are told, is
always done by policy.8
This Article defies this trend and marks a departure from the conventional
wisdom. It argues for formalism as the best normative theory of contract law
adjudication.9 It attempts to show, in other words, that things go better if we actually
1

P.S. Atiyah, Form and Substance in Contract Law, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 119
(1990). See also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 509 (1988) (noting that,
“[w]ith accelerating frequency, legal decisions and theories are condemned as ‘formalist’ or
‘formalistic’”); Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2004) (highlighting that
“few terms have been used more often to criticize legal thought and practice”).
2
See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
251, 251 (1975) (discussing the change in the legal system from an “expression of the moral
sense of the community” to an entity that serves commercial interests).
3
Or, using Cohen’s language, with “transcendental nonsense.” Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811
(1935).
4
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 18 (1995) (regarding classical contract
theory).
5
Id. at 98.
6
See Paul Troop, Why Legal Formalism Is Not a Stupid Thing, 31 RATIO JURIS 428,
428 (2018).
7
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988).
8
Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American Legal
Realism, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2021 (2015) (noting that when gaps in legal materials are
identified, we ask and are expected “to articulate the ‘policy’ considerations that explain”
legal outcomes).
9
Theories of adjudication can be positive or normative. A positive theory of
adjudication attempts to explain how judges in fact decide cases. A normative theory is
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ask judges not to resort to policy when deciding contractual disputes, but to instead
apply the law. Given formalism’s disrepute in American legal culture,10 as well as
how little has been done to identify the precise target of the criticisms, a fully
articulated description and a robust defense of formalism are crucial. This Article
attempts to be a contribution, focused specifically on contract law, in both of these
respects: it sets out the specific features of a formalist theory of adjudication and
offers a normative argument for its implementation in contractual disputes.
As will become clear below, formalism has a certain resemblance,11 in its
operation, to the non-instrumental views of private law theorists like Ernest
Weinrib12 and Peter Benson.13 However, unlike Weinrib and Benson, in this Article
I start from a thoroughly instrumentalist justification of contract law. Thus, the
Article assumes a very different view about contract law’s foundations and their
relationship to contract law adjudication.14 Moreover, formalism is not based on
philosophically thick commitments. It does not rest on a Kantian reconstruction of
private rights or on an elucidation of the conditions that allow for the reciprocal
freedom of purposive agents. Instead, it coheres with the more traditional, breadand-butter approach of the doctrinal lawyer, who aspires to achieve systematicity
and coherence at a much lower level of abstraction, and whose tools are not found
in the philosophy of Kant or Hegel, but in the precedents, doctrines, and treatises of
the law of contracts. The question, then, is whether this less philosophically
ambitious theory of adjudication is normatively desirable. Thus, while the complete
concerned with how judges ought to decide cases—how they should use legal reasons and
materials in the justification of their decisions. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:
Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 295 (1997); Lewis A. Kornhauser
& Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L. J. 82, 110 n.37 (1986).
10
P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 29 (1991) (noting that “the term ‘formalism’ is today often used in American
and, to a lesser extent, in English legal writing and legal theory, to refer to such vices as
conceptualism, over-emphasis on the inherent logic of legal concepts, the overgeneralization of case-law, and the like”).
11
But see Part III.F.
12
See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2003) (discussing the limits that the internal justificatory structure
of private law places on contract remedies).
13
See, e.g., Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive
Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
1077, 1079–80 (1989) (arguing for an autonomous, internalist, and non-distributive
conception of the law of contracts); Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1673–74 (2006).
14
See generally Felipe Jiménez, Two Questions for Private Law Theory, (Univ. of So.
Cal. Gould Sch. of Law 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=34529
09 [https://perma.cc/8AFN-8J2W] (arguing that private law theory ought to separate
questions about the foundations of private law from questions about the adjudication of
private law disputes).
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clarification of formalism as an approach and the normative argument for it will rest
on philosophical considerations, the approach itself is not philosophically ambitious.
This, as will become clearer below, is a feature, not a deficit.
Precisely because formalism is unashamedly doctrinal, it is also distinct from
the interpretive textualism of Scalia15 and its staunch preference for rules as opposed
to standards.16 While formalism is sympathetic to the value of rules in the costeffective resolution of easy cases and recommends limiting attention to semantic (as
opposed to pragmatic) considerations in adjudication, it also acknowledges the need
for adjudicating hard cases and for the incremental development of law beyond the
pure semantic meaning of legal materials. In this aspect, the notion of legal
principles, as I will explain below,17 plays a crucial role.
Formalism is thus neither metaphysical nor textualist. And it rests on a
normative argument about what approach to contract law adjudication would make
things go best. Because of this, the question this Article asks is the following: If
contract law is morally valuable and politically justified because of its good social
effects, such as its contribution to market exchange and economic efficiency, how
should judges decide contractual disputes? The answer is that they should follow a
formalist theory of adjudication such as the one presented in this Article. Thus, this
Article describes formalism as a theory of adjudication, setting out its main features,
and offers a normative argument in favor of its use as the appropriate approach to
contract law adjudication.
I will begin by clarifying the precise meaning of formalism and setting out its
specific features—for now, a concise idea will suffice: formalism recommends
applying the limitedly enriched literal meaning of the legal rules and doctrines of
contract law and their settled doctrinal construction, without directly considering the
instrumental purposes of contract law. Thereafter, I will argue that
instrumentalists—those who, like law and economics scholars, believe that contract
law’s value derives from its contribution to social welfare18—should see formalism
as the appropriate approach to the adjudication of contractual disputes. Indeed,
formalism is a decision procedure that, in the long run, and given the current state
of the law of contracts, maximizes the instrumental efficacy of contract law.19 The
reasons underlying this claim, as I will explain, are connected to several of
formalism’s advantages, including that it contributes to simple, generalizable, and
cost-effective decision-making; it is consistent with the institutional competence of
courts; it reduces the risks and overall costs of legal mistakes; and it increases
predictability, protecting contractual parties’ legitimate expectations. Moreover,
formalism is an adequate means to deal with value pluralism and is consistent with

15

See generally, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
16
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
17
See infra Part V.
18
See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006).
19
See infra Part VI.
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the main values plausibly served by the law of contracts, such as autonomy and
efficiency. Thus, we are not all realists now; nor should we be.
Part II of the Article describes the instrumentalist starting point of my
argument, as well as some of the argument’s additional assumptions. Part III states
and describes the main structural features of formalism as a theory of adjudication,
focusing particularly on its operation in routine or easy cases. Because questions
about the right normative theory of adjudication are comparative, Part IV offers a
brief sketch of some possible alternative theories. Part V moves on to describe
formalism’s operation in hard cases, and how a formalist theory of adjudication can
make sense of the idea of adjudication as application of pre-existing law even in
such cases. Part VI supplements the description of formalism with actual examples
from contract law. Part VII contains the normative argument for formalism and
offers a series of instrumentalist considerations in favor of its use as the best
approach towards the adjudication of contractual disputes. Finally, the conclusion
refers to the comparative advantages of formalism over other theories of
adjudication, and argues that, because of these advantages, instrumentalist and noninstrumentalist scholars could agree at the level of adjudication about the value of a
formalist approach, despite their deeper disagreements about contract law’s
normative foundations.
II. PREMISES
A. An Instrumentalist View of Contract Law’s Foundations
The disagreement between non-instrumentalist and instrumentalist views of
contract law is a disagreement about its value. Non-instrumentalist conceptions see
contract law as valuable because of its recognition of private individuals’ power to
form and change their legal relations.20 Contract law, under these accounts, reflects
a certain “morality of interpersonal interaction.”21 An instrumental view of contract
law, on the other hand, claims that the moral justification of contract law is given by
its valuable social consequences. The justification of contract law does not lie in the
moral dimension or juridical structure of private interaction, but rather in the social
effects that contract law produces.22 The economic analysis of contract law is a good

20

Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 29, 37 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (noting that autonomy theories—which
constitute an instance of non-instrumentalist theories—“view contract law as a legal
institution that recognizes and respects the power of private individuals to effect changes in
their legal relations inter se, within certain limits”).
21
ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS xi (2016).
22
See Liam Murphy, The Practice of Promise and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 151, 153–54 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014).
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example of an instrumentalist perspective. Instrumentalism, however, is also
compatible with a more pluralistic account of the foundational goals of contract
law.23
The starting point of my argument is, in this sense, instrumentalist. Of course,
not everyone agrees with the instrumentalist view of contract law. But it is, at least,
a prima facie plausible view about the practice. My focus here is not, however, the
ultimate moral foundation of contract law. Instead, I pursue a second-order question.
If one thinks that contract law’s best justification is instrumental, what would that
fact entail for the approach we should use to adjudicate contractual disputes? While
many theorists are instrumentalists when it comes to both contract law’s foundations
and to contractual adjudication,24 it is not evident that the instrumentally best
strategy for adjudicating contractual disputes is itself instrumental. An
instrumentalist justification of contract law is compatible with a non-instrumentalist
approach to adjudication. Indeed, it is perfectly feasible to disentangle the
justification of a legal practice and the justification of actions and decisions within
it.25 And, if my normative argument proves persuasive, an instrumentalist view of
contract law might require a non-instrumentalist theory of adjudication.
I am not the first to suggest an instrumentalist argument for a formalist
approach to contract law. There is a growing neo-formalist revival in contract law,26
particularly in the work of legal economists.27 But my argument is different from
23

My view includes contract law’s contribution to the development and sustainment of
markets and their economic effects, but also other goals, such as the expansion of personal
autonomy, and the advancement of a modest—yet important—conception of social equality.
24
See generally, e.g., Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235 (Morris
Dickstein ed., 1998).
25
See generally John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (showing
the importance, for moral theories, of distinguishing between justifying a practice and
justifying a particular action falling under it); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference,
Well-Being, and Morality in Social Decisions, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 326 (2003).
26
See generally David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
842 (1999) (identifying a formalist trend in contract theory); Mark Movsesian, Formalism in
American Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115 (2006)
(distinguishing between classical and more recent versions of formalism in contract
doctrine); John Murray, Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869 (2002) (characterizing recent contract theory as “neoformalist”).
27
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy]; Curtis
Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism,
and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (2008);
JONATHAN MORGAN, CONTRACT LAW MINIMALISM: A FORMALIST RESTATEMENT OF
COMMERCIAL CONTRACT LAW (2013); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott,

2020]

CONTRACT LAW ADJUDICATION

1127

these views in at least three differences from those of such scholars. The first
difference is that, while neo-formalists usually restrict the scope of their arguments
to contracts between sophisticated firms, my argument provides an account that aims
to be applicable to all types of contractual disputes. The second difference is that,
while I also start from an instrumentalist perspective, I remain open about the precise
identity of contract law’s goals and would hold a more pluralistic view of them. In
my view, the valuable social effects of contract law are diverse and irreducible to a
single metric of efficiency. The third difference is that my focus is not on the
interpretation of contracts, but on the interpretation of contract law (i.e., not on
contracts as instruments used between private parties, but on contract law as the set
of legal rules governing such instruments).28
Regardless of these differences, the central claim of this Article is consistent
with the general spirit of the neo-formalist approach: the best way for contract law
to achieve its instrumental goals is by not pursuing them directly.
B. Some Additional Assumptions
Before making the normative argument, let me state the additional
assumptions—beyond the instrumentalist starting point—that I make in this Article.
First, I ignore collegiality. Against actual reality, I will assume that all courts
are composed of one single judge. By making this assumption, I am able to ignore
the complexities of collegial judicial decision-making,29 which arguably complicate
any plausible theory of adjudication given the possibility of internal disagreement
and the need for collective deliberation.
Second, I assume that whatever theory of adjudication is best should be—and
will be—implemented in a coordinated way. In other words, I assume that an
attractive theory of adjudication should be suitable for implementation by a
multiplicity of judges; and that, as a matter of fact, at any given moment only one
theory of adjudication will be followed by all judges.
Third, I assume that a theory of adjudication should apply primarily to cases
that fall under the broad terms of pre-existing legal materials (e.g., statutes, judicial

Contract Theory]; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119
YALE L. J. 926 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux]; Robert
E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (1999).
28
On the distinction, see Lewis Kornhauser & W. Bentley MacLeod, Contracts
Between Legal Persons, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 918 (Robert
Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2012). See also Menachem Mautner, A Justice Perspective of
Contract Law: How Contract Law Allocates Entitlements, 10 TEL AVIV U. STUD. L. 239, 240
(1990).
29
See generally Lewis Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992) (describing the problems and complexities that collegiality may
generate for judicial decision-making procedures).
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opinions, and administrative regulations).30 This assumption helps me to clarify how
the theory of adjudication applies to most routine cases, and to address its operation
in hard cases only once we have a clear grasp of how it routinely operates to address
“everyday” contractual disputes.31
The fourth assumption I make is that the theory of adjudication will be applied
in the present circumstances of contract law, as it exists in most liberal Western
jurisdictions, such as the U.S., Germany, or England. Thus, I would readily accept
that, in different historical circumstances (e.g., when the common law of contracts
was starting to develop) and economic or sociocultural conditions, a very different
theory from the one I propose might be the most attractive approach.
Finally, I assume that a normative theory of adjudication has two (artificially
separated) components: interpretation and construction. Interpretation is the
determination of the communicative content (i.e., the linguistic meaning) of legal
materials.32 The task of interpretation requires determining what a certain legal
material means. Construction is the determination of the legal implications (i.e.,
legal rules, doctrines, rights, and obligations) that derive from those legal
materials.33 The task of construction requires determining what the legal impact of
those materials is. Importantly, the determination of the legal implications might
simply consist of replicating the meaning of the legal materials, applying it to the
case at hand, or might instead translate it into more complex forms of legal doctrine.

30
Formalism does not presuppose a specific view about the concept of law. It assumes
a thin and common-sense view of what types of texts and artifacts constitute legal materials
(i.e. a more or less minimal and pre-theoretical account of what counts as law, such as the
one that both positivists and non-positivists might share as the minimal social conditions of
legal validity, or of what counts as the relevant coordination artifacts that a theory of
adjudication should take into account).
31
Thus, I try to avoid the fixation with hard cases that characterizes a lot of
contemporary legal thinking. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399,
407 (1985) [hereinafter Schauer, Easy Cases] (with reference to contemporary constitutional
theory).
32
I use the term “interpretation,” thus, in a wide sense, not exclusively restricted to
cases of semantic vagueness or unclear meaning.
33
In making these distinctions, I follow Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833–35 (1964); Lawrence B. Solum,
The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103–08 (2010)
[hereinafter Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction]; Lawrence B. Solum,
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 480–84 (2013);
Peter M. Tiersma, The Ambiguity of Interpretation: Distinguishing Interpretation from
Construction, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1095, 1097 (1995). For an excellent analysis in contract
law, see generally Gregory Klass, Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the InterpretationConstruction Distinction Right, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2020) (discussing
the distinction and relationship between interpretation and construction in contract and
constitutional theory).
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III. FORMALISM, DEFINED
There are several forms of formalism,34 and the recent literature characterizes
formalism in different ways.35 Because of this, any argument about formalism
should clarify what it means by the term.36 By formalism, I mean a theory of
adjudication that recommends a strict adherence to the literal meaning (limitedly
enriched by public facts about the historical context and other objective features that
determine meaning) of the legal rules and doctrines of contract law and their settled
doctrinal construction, without directly considering the instrumental purposes of
contract law. This entails that formally applicable legal rules and their
accompanying doctrines should not be set aside by judges to achieve contract law’s
goals. Thus, formalism demands taking communicative content as mostly
determined by literal meaning, with very limited consideration of pragmatic and
contextual elements. It also requires constructing the legal upshots of literal
meaning—its legal content—taking into consideration only that narrowly construed
meaning and its settled doctrinal interpretation.
Given the main features of the theory of adjudication I defend, the term
‘formalism’ is an apt label. Still, I do not attempt to defend the theory as the best
version of formalism, an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the
concept, or its historically accurate reconstruction. The label captures the central
tenets of the theory of adjudication I will defend. But one should not read too much
into the label. The central normative claim of this Article is for the theory of
adjudication to be adopted, not for the appropriateness of the label I use to designate
it.
To flesh out in more detail what I mean by formalism, the rest of this part sets
out the central traits of the theory: retrospectivity, rule-boundedness, decisional
restriction, doctrinalism, and nuanced literalism.
A. Retrospectivity
Retrospectivity means that the adjudicator’s decision should look backwards;
it should focus on past events as the basis for their decision. This trait of formalism
is opposed to the ex-ante perspective characteristic of consequentialist decision-

34

Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (1999).
According to Brian Leiter, formalism is characterized by two traits: it sees law as
“rationally determinate,” and adjudication as autonomous from non-legal normative
reasoning. Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL
THEORY 111, 111 (2010). See also Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”:
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531 (1999); Schauer, supra note 1,
at 510; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2003).
36
As noted by BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 160 (2009).
35
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making.37 Retrospectivity demands courts to take an ex-post orientation to determine
the rights and duties of the parties.38 The role of the judge is to decide cases by
applying the preexisting legal materials to the dispute at hand, without resorting to
prospective considerations.
B. Rule-Boundedness
Under formalism, judges should treat the available legal materials and doctrine
as providing and establishing serious rules (rules applying and giving a solution to
all cases that fall under their terms) governing their decisions, which should be
applied without further inquiry into goals and consequences.39
Rule-boundedness is not conceptually necessary. It is part of a normative theory
of adjudication. Thus, rule-boundedness does not rest on a conceptual claim about
legal rules being determinate,40 exclusionary,41 leading to all or nothing
application,42 etc. On the contrary, there are different ways to justify decisions and
actions on the basis of rules,43 and the very same legal texts may be treated
differently by interpreters. Different legal systems and cultures may approach the
interpretation of their rules—and even of the same rules, in the case of legal
transplants—in different ways.44 If rules are treated as exclusionary reasons, this is
because of the interpreter’s approach, and not because of their “ruleness.”45 Thus,
one should not assume that legal rules necessarily lead to formalistic application,
37

For Jody Kraus, the preference for an ex ante or an ex post approach to adjudication
is one of the fundamental methodological disagreements between what he calls economic
and deontic theories. Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 701–03 (Jules L. Coleman,
Kenneth Einar Himma & Scott J. Shapiro ed. 2004).
38
Benson, supra note 20, at 52.
39
On the idea of a “serious rule,” see Alexander, supra note 35, at 541.
40
Cf. Id. at 544.
41
Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 73–76 (1999).
42
Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977) (arguing that “[r]ules
are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion”). Thus, for all his criticism of the model of rules,
Dworkin saw rules exactly as his positivist opponents saw them. See Timothy Endicott, Are
There Any Rules?, 5 J. OF ETHICS 199, 201–04 (2001).
43
Thus, here I depart from Rawls’s analysis in Rawls, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing that
one must distinguish “between the justification of a rule or practice and the justification of a
particular action falling under it”).
44
This is clear in comparative law. Comparative analyses do not simply resort to a
comparison of legal norms, but transcend textual analysis in order to take a broader look at
the legal culture, and at the way in which lawyers and scholars approach legal materials. See
generally Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and
Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 495
(1998) arguing for comparative analysis transcending the surface level of legal rules and for
a greater engagement with legal culture and legal reasoning.
45
FERNANDO ATRIA, ON LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 97 (2002).
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that they apply in an all-or-nothing fashion, etc. It is true, as Rawls claimed, that to
engage in a practice means to follow its rules.46 However, there are different ways
of following and applying rules, and the decision regarding how to follow and apply
them is, in the end, normative.47 The normative force of rules depends, in the end,
on normative considerations, and not just on their semantic applicability or legal
validity.48
Because of this, formalism does not rest on supposedly conceptual
characteristics of legal rules. Instead, it claims that judges ought to decide cases by
applying legal rules and doctrines as generally exclusionary and indefeasible
mandates (i.e., as serious rules), because of the normative considerations supporting
that approach.
C. Decisional Restriction
Formalism argues that the adjudication of contractual disputes should be based
on a limited domain of reasons connected to pre-existing legal materials (i.e. ‘legal
reasons’). This notion of decisional restriction is connected to the idea that there is
a limited domain of acceptable arguments in legal discourse, so that not every
argument counts as an acceptable argument for a particular decision or
interpretation.49
Decisional restriction might make the adequate adjudicative decision differ
from what would be the best all-things-considered decision in the case at hand. Still,
it is compatible with adjudicative decisions incorporating what Eisenberg calls
“social propositions,” such as moral norms, policies and experiential
propositions50—whether such incorporation is dictated by pre-existing legal
materials or seems necessary given the particularities of the case. The peculiarity is
that, for being incorporated, such propositions must be formulated in terms of
criteria that are connected to the pre-existing legal materials.51 They must be justified
46

Rawls, supra note 25, at 26.
Rawls himself acknowledged this. See id. at 29.
48
Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule-Following Argument, 3 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 187, 192 (1990) (arguing that “rules do not determine their own
application”); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 126 (1991)
[hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES] (arguing that “the process of taking a rule to
be applicable depends not only on the rule’s own designation of applicability, even
presupposing internal validity, but of something external to that rule and to the rule-system
of which it is a part”). See also STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITTGENSTEIN,
SKEPTICISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY 303 (1979).
49
On the idea of law as a limited domain, see Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain
of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1914–15 (2004).
50
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON L AW 14–32 (1988).
51
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 59 (Zenon Bankowski ed.,
Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., The European University Institute Press Series)
(1993).
47
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“on legal grounds,”52 and be translated into reasons53 that arise from, or can be
connected to, pre-existing legal materials.
Note that decisional restriction is possible even if one denies the idea of law as
a distinct domain, as Dworkin’s one system view—which claims that law rightly
understood is a subset of political morality54—does, and as some more recent similar
views, such as Kornhauser’s eliminativism55 and Greenberg’s moral impact theory,56
do. Under these views, it might at first seem that judges cannot rely on a limited
domain of legal reasons for their decisions, because what judges ought to do is
underdetermined by legal materials. The theory of adjudication, under this view, is
a freestanding decision procedure, and governs how judges should decide cases
without any need for first finding out “what the law is.”57 The existence of legal
materials is just one of the relevant facts to be taken into consideration when
deciding a particular dispute.
I am skeptical about the relevance of jurisprudence for normative theories of
adjudication: at least, it is not necessary for judges to have a philosophical theory
about the content and the grounds of law in order to fulfil their role as adjudicators.58
However, even assuming that the jurisprudential views of Dworkin, Kornhauser or
Greenberg are right, and that jurisprudence has a bearing on adjudication, decisional
restriction is still possible. Indeed, a normative theory of adjudication is a moral
argument about how judges ought to decide cases. This means that, as a moral
argument, it takes into consideration all the relevant concerns that Dworkin and
Greenberg claim are part of legal decision-making. Moreover, a normative theory of
adjudication is precisely what Kornhauser’s eliminativism requires. If the case for
formalism is morally sound, then one can perfectly say, with Dworkin and
Greenberg, that the moral impact of legal materials is given by the limitedly enriched
semantic content of legal materials and their settled doctrinal construction, because
this is the morally adequate effect that said materials have on our moral obligations.59
And, with Kornhauser, one could claim that decisional restriction does not derive
from the concept of law, but simply from the right account of how judges should
decide cases—though, admittedly, in such a case decisional restriction would not
52

JAN M. SMITS, THE MIND AND METHOD OF THE LEGAL ACADEMIC 61 (2012).
See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 455, 462 (1989)
(noting the possibility of translation of “social” propositions into “legal” propositions).
54
See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS ch. 19 (2011).
55
See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, Doing Without the Concept of Law (N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 15–33, 2015). For criticism, see LIAM MURPHY, WHAT
MAKES LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 88–102 (2014).
56
See generally Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J.
1288 (2014).
57
Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 3.
58
MURPHY, supra note 55, at 8.
59
Of course, Dworkin and Greenberg would disagree with this view about the moral
impact of legal materials. They would reject decisional restriction. But this is a substantive
disagreement that we might have even within the one-system framework they prefer.
53
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refer to “legal” reasons, but to reasons “extracted from the limited domain of
relevant legal materials.”60 While formalism’s talk of “legal materials” and “legal
reasons” is apt to make this point, the point can also be made without any reference
to the legal character of those materials and reasons (i.e., without assuming a definite
concept of law that is necessarily independent from moral considerations).61
D. Doctrinalism
Formalism is not just about legal materials. It is also about legal doctrine. Legal
doctrine is the construction of the legal implications of legal rules and materials by
past judges and scholars, using a specifically juristic approach.62 At least in
American legal academia, this approach has been increasingly decaying.63
Formalism goes against this trend.
A doctrinalist approach attempts to achieve the explanation and systematization
of contract law from an internal perspective. Here, ‘contract law’ is understood as
the content and reasons derived from legal materials and their correct interpretation.
Doctrine should be built based on such materials.64
This point about legal materials as the starting point of doctrinalism is worth
emphasizing and explaining further. Formalism is premised on a strong distinction
between justifying legal norms and applying them.65 Doctrinalism is, in this sense,
an internal perspective66 that provides an internal justification (i.e., a justification for
particular decisions as application of pre-existing legal norms).67 It places a big
emphasis on conceptual elaboration and classificatory taxonomy,68 and on the
60
This brings home Murphy’s point about how artificial and full of paraphrases our
discourse about law becomes if we accept eliminativism. MURPHY, supra note 55, at 90, 99.
61
Again, formalism rests on a thin and common-sense view of what types of texts and
artifacts count as legal materials, and because it does not rely on a specific jurisprudential
view about the grounds of law, it is compatible with seeing those past “legal” materials as
the relevant past authoritative decisions or the relevant coordination artifacts that a theory of
adjudication should consider (in case one prefers to take a one-system or eliminativist view
of the concept of law). Nothing of substance, in the end, turns on whether we call these
reasons and materials “legal”—I simply prefer these terms rather than the more convoluted
terms the eliminativist would.
62
SMITS, supra note 52, at 7.
63
Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100
HARV. L. REV. 761 passim (1987).
64
ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, ON LAW AND REASON 274 (2008).
65
See KLAUS GÜNTHER, THE SENSE OF APPROPRIATENESS: APPLICATION DISCOURSES
IN MORALITY AND LAW 248, 256 (1993) see generally Rawls, supra note 25.
66
SMITS, supra note 52, at 20.
67
AULIS AARNIO, REASON AND AUTHORITY: A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMIC PARADIGM
OF LEGAL DOGMATICS 189 (1997).
68
A relevant example of this emphasis on classification and taxonomy in the common
law is the work of Peter Birks. See generally PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2005)
(arguing for the relevance of taxonomy in the law of unjust enrichment); PETER BIRKS, THE
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artificial maps69 developed by judges and legal writers that provide a reconstruction
of legal concepts and their mutual relationships.
Doctrinalism thus understood finds its models in the work of classical German
jurists, such as Savigny,70 and less recently, in the work of the late scholastics.71
Doctrinalism also fits comfortably with the classical legal treatise or textbook and is
consistent with the traditional approach of the American Law Institute’s
Restatements.72 It is a key feature of the traditional common law approach, which
has allowed it to endure, as Balganesh and Parchomovosky put it, “over time and
context, and in the face of changing social values and preferences.”73 Because of
this, doctrinalism is not just the work of scholars, although it does see the upshots of
legal materials as partly determined by their work.74 Doctrinal categories,
taxonomies, and concepts are also—and in some cases, mostly—derived from the
work of judges, particularly (or perhaps, more evidently) in common law systems.75
E. Nuanced Literalism
In terms of the distinction between communicative content and legal content,
formalism claims that (i) the communicative content of legal texts should be derived
from their semantic content, with limited contextual and pragmatic additions; and

ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (Eric Descheemaeker ed., 2014) (offering a taxonomy of the
Roman law of obligations).
69
Alan Watson, Artificiality, Reality and Roman Contract Law, 57 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 147, 147 (1989).
70
SMITS, supra note 52, at 16–17; KAIUS TUORI, ANCIENT ROMAN LAWYERS AND
MODERN LEGAL IDEALS: STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF ANCIENT ROMAN LEGAL HISTORY 59 (2007).
71
On the late scholastics, see Helge Dedek, The Splendour of Form: Scholastic
Jurisprudence and Irrational Formality, 5 LAW & HUMAN. 349 (2011) (offering an analysis
of the connections between contemporary legal discourse and Scholastic jurisprudence);
JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1993)
[hereinafter GORDLEY, MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE] (offering a reconstruction of
contract law on the basis of the work of the late scholastics); JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS
OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2006) (offering a
theory of private law based on the work of classical jurists, including the late scholastics).
72
See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1317
(2001).
73
Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the
Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (2015).
74
See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 346–48 (1991) (analyzing legal scholarship as
a “legal formant” or a source of law).
75
See JOHN MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA ch. 6 (3d. 2007).
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(ii) the legal implications of those texts should be determined by applying this
communicative content along with their settled doctrinal construction to the case at
hand.
When scholars and practitioners discuss what a certain legal text “means,” they
refer to diverse things such as literal meaning, contextual meaning, intended
meaning, etc.76 Semantic content is the most basic building block of meaning. It is
determined by the semantics and syntax of the relevant expression.77 Thus, semantic
content is settled by the lexical meaning of the words used and the sentence’s
syntactic structure.78 It is, in brief terms, the artificially isolated linguistic meaning
of the text.79 One level up the ladder is assertive content, which considers the specific
context in which the semantic content was issued or uttered,80 and the specific
content that the speaker or issuer intended to communicate.81
Of course, there is a gap between semantic content and legal content—between
what the text’s literal meaning communicates and the legally correct answers. Thus,
I agree with the claim that, in principle, “literal meaning cannot be decisive of what’s
legally correct.”82 But I agree only in principle, since there might sometimes be good
normative reasons to make what’s legally correct a reflection of literal meaning. This
is precisely what the normative argument for formalism claims should happen in
easy cases. However, in many circumstances judges will need to make certain
assumptions about the contexts in which the legal materials were enacted or issued
in order to unpack their communicative content.83 I also accept that context might
play a semantic role, supplying additional information to that derived exclusively
from literal meaning.84 Finally, under formalism, public facts about “the relevant

76

Richard H. Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2015) (noting that “in
claiming what a statutory or constitutional provision means, judges, lawyers, and scholars
often invoke or refer to what I characterize as its literal or semantic meaning, its contextual
meaning as framed by the shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, its real
conceptual meaning, its intended meaning, its reasonable meaning, or its previously
interpreted meaning”).
77
Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects
of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF L ANGUAGE IN THE LAW 83, 84
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
78
ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 22–23 (2014).
79
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 33, at 98.
80
Marmor, supra note 78, at 84.
81
Greenberg, supra note 56, at 1292.
82
Brian Flanagan, Revisiting the Contribution of Literal Meaning to Legal Meaning,
30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 256 (2010). See also Mark Greenberg, The Standard
Picture and Its Discontents, in OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 42 (Leslie
Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
83
As suggested by John Searle, Literal Meaning, 13 ERKENNTNIS 207, 207 (1978).
84
Jason Stanley & Zoltán Gendler Szabó, On Quantifier Domain Restriction, 15 MIND
& LANG. 219, 229 (2000).
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context and the relevant legal background”85 have a role in enriching semantic
content. Thus, formalism advocates a nuanced form of literalism, which gives salient
relevance to semantic meaning but does not require inferring meaning exclusively
from semantic content in every possible instance. This semantic content might be
enriched by narrow context (i.e., by “matters of objective fact to which the
determination of the semantic contents of certain expressions are sensitive,”86) as
well as by limited pragmatic considerations.
Formalism also admits that even this enriched literal meaning can be
insufficient to determine the meaning of an authoritative legal text fully and
univocally.87 But formalism is not just committed to nuanced literalism. Its elements
operate jointly, and thus doctrinalism plays a crucial role in determinatively
specifying the legal implications of ambiguous or equivocal legal materials.
Semantic meaning does not exhaust the extension of doctrinal concepts. On the
contrary, the legal culture’s use of those concepts constitutes a “specialized usage”88
which helps determine that extension. This means that semantic content, under
formalism, is doctrinally enriched. The semantic content of legal materials might be
incomplete and vague, but legal doctrine also governs formalist adjudication.89
Formalism is thus, primarily, a doctrinalist position. It sees the importance of
semantic meaning and the value of restricting contextual and pragmatic
considerations for settling the communicative content of legal materials. At the same
time, it replaces a stubborn attachment to texts with a more nuanced attention to the
ways in which these texts are enriched by the conceptual taxonomies and systematic
relationships between legal concepts and doctrines that characterize our legal
practices.
F. Corrective Justice?
Formalism presents certain similarities to some existing non-instrumental
views of contract law adjudication. For instance, the ideas of decisional restriction
and retrospectivity seem particularly consistent with corrective justice perspectives
in private law.90 Because of this, it might be useful to clarify the relationship between
the two views.
85

MARMOR, supra note 77, at 115.
Kent Bach, Context Dependence, in THE BLOOMSBURY COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 153, 156 (Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel eds., 2014).
87
See MARMOR, supra note 78, at 83–84 (underlining the limitations of semantic
content).
88
Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1257.
89
Troop, supra note 6, at 434.
90
See generally, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 12 (offering a corrective justice view of
contract remedies); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (2012) [hereinafter
WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW] (arguing that private law is an autonomous, non-instrumental
practice supported by its own rationality based on notions of Kantian right and corrective
justice).
86
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Corrective justice is the form of justice that rectifies inequalities in
interpersonal transactions.91 As a form of justice, corrective justice stands in contrast
to distributive justice, which deals with the distribution of goods and burdens across
society.92 The judge’s role when adjudicating a contractual dispute, under a
corrective justice view, is simply to grant a remedy that rectifies the breach of
contractual duty.93
Formalism, on my account, achieves something akin to corrective justice,
rectifying breaches of contract through the strict application of the remedial rules
and doctrines of contract law. Crucially, however, it is legal corrective justice, not
natural corrective justice, that is being achieved.94 The baseline for rectification is
not provided by corrective justice as an abstract principle of interpersonal morality,
but by the legal rules themselves. The same can be said of the remedial response that
restores the promisee to that baseline.
Moreover, while Weinrib and others are right when they highlight the bipolar
and retrospective features of private law adjudication,95 they get things backwards,
in my view, when they assume that these features can also be a self-standing
justification of private law. Indeed, although judges are crucial institutional agents
in private law, what they do (or ought to do) is not the whole story about private law.
Unjustifiably, corrective justice scholars universalize the institutional position of the
judge, transforming it into the whole justificatory theory of private law. The mistake
is to assume that, since the judge should only consider reasons of corrective justice,
it must be the case that private law is justified only on the basis of corrective justice.
On the contrary, the fact that a judge should only consider a limited type of reasons
for her decision does not mean that these are the only reasons in favor or against
such decision.96 There is no justification for assuming that the reasons that should
be relevant to one particular institution exhaust the reasons justifying or explaining
the practice that institution is a part of. In fact, we might have very good reasons for
judicial decisions to be motivated by the rectification of the breach of legal rights by
private parties, and not by the underlying goals of contract law. But transforming
the theory of adjudication into the whole justificatory structure underlying private
law and contract law is unwarranted. Thus, although formalism presents some
similarities with corrective justice, the starting point and foundations of the two
theories are extremely different.

91

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 178 (1980). See also Ernest J.
Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002)
(characterizing corrective justice as the rectification of interpersonal injustice).
92
See FINNIS, supra note 91, at 166.
93
See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, at 136–40.
94
See Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 773
(2001) (making the distinction between legal and natural corrective justice).
95
See WEINRIB, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, at ch. 5.
96
See John Gardner, The Purity and Priority of Private Law, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 459,
463–64 (1996).
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IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
From an instrumentalist perspective, the question about the correct approach
towards the adjudication of contractual disputes is comparative. An instrumentalist
argument in favor of a theory of adjudication depends on the assessment of its costs
and benefits,97 as compared to feasible alternatives, all of which turns on empirical
facts.
This empirical assessment, however, is not the path pursued here. While,
admittedly, a definitive instrumentalist defense of formalism requires this empirical
evaluation, the claim is more limited: there are generally good instrumental reasons
to assume a formalistic approach in the adjudication of contractual disputes. The
balance of considerations makes formalism the most plausible candidate as the
correct theory. This approach is compatible with empirical evidence having the final
say. In the absence of such evidence, my claim is that we have generally good
reasons to strive for a much more constrained approach to the adjudication of
contractual disputes.
But, again, evaluating such reasons turns on the alternatives. For such purposes,
this part of the Article presents a sketch of some stylized normative theories of
adjudication that might serve as comparative benchmarks: conventionalism,
pragmatism, and interpretivism. My account is partly based on Dworkin’s taxonomy
of rival conceptions of law in Law’s Empire.98 However, I treat each of these theories
as a normative theory of adjudication, and my own reconstruction departs in
important respects from Dworkin’s characterization. Also, while in each case I refer
to the work of several theorists, I should not be interpreted as claiming that, for
instance, Hart or Raz are conventionalists in the terms in which I define the term.
What I am trying to do is to capture, by drawing a somewhat impressionistic picture,
some familiar and plausible ways of approaching what judges should do when
adjudicating contractual disputes, in order to later contrast these potential
approaches with formalism.
A. Conventionalism
Conventionalism is arguably the standard lay view of adjudication. It is the
view that underlies judicial nomination processes and much of the opposition to
judicial activism and “legislation from the bench.” Conventionalism claims that
judges ought to decide cases by applying pre-existing valid legal rules independently
of their normative desirability, whenever those rules give a clear answer to the case
at hand.99 In such cases, one could say, the case belongs to the core of the valid legal
97

See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 4250 (2008) (offering a cost-benefit comparison of different approaches to common law
reasoning).
98
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE].
99
Id. at 114–74.
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rule. Legal validity, on the conventionalist picture, rests on social facts, like social
conventions or legal officials’ practices,100 such as Hart’s rule of recognition.101 In
other cases, belonging to the penumbra of legal rules, judges should engage in
interstitial and discretional law-making, but their activity in such cases should be
constrained by the existing legal rules to some extent.102 Thus, conventionalism does
not endorse judicial discretion as synonymous to caprice,103 since unregulated cases
are governed by laws that guide and constrain what judges can do. But after that
general guidance, judges do need to make choices among the possible solutions.104
In terms of the key features of formalism that I identified above,
conventionalism is similar to formalism in its analysis of easy cases belonging to the
core of legal rules. It is consistent with retrospectivity. It also sees adjudication as
rule-bound. It also accepts a thin and limited version of decisional restriction, in the
sense that judges should apply valid legal sources in easy cases. In hard cases,
however, judges should make new law, relying on moral and other non-legal
considerations,105 and partly on existing law. Conventionalism is not evidently
committed to doctrinalism. In fact, it might be inconsistent with some of its aspects,
such as systematicity (i.e., the view of legal norms as part of a complex system of
interconnected concepts and institutions).106 Finally, it is not necessarily committed
to nuanced literalism (though it might be), because it is compatible with different
ways of determining the communicative content of legal texts.
Conventionalism is, however, committed to a certain view about the connection
between communicative and legal content: identity. The rules to apply are whatever
norms are to be found in the legal materials. And the rules coincide with actual
sentences and utterances in legal texts.107 For conventionalism, once the
communicative content of legal texts has been figured out, there is nothing left for

100

Id. at 114–15.
See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–110 (1994).
102
See generally Joseph Raz, The Inner Logic of the Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 249 (1995) (arguing that the
exercise of judicial discretion is directed and subject to specific duties). On the distinction
between core and penumbra, see generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1957); see also HART, supra note 101, at 124–154.
103
See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L. J. 823, 847–48
(1972) (arguing that judicial discretion is different from arbitrary judgment).
104
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 181
(1979).
105
Id. at 49–50.
106
See generally Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and System in the Law,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 16 (2000) (arguing in support of systematicity and its technical
vocabulary).
107
Although such utterances need not be taken in isolation from their context and may
be “pragmatically enriched.” Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO
JURIS. 423, 423 (2008).
101

1140

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

the judge to do—if she is to act as a judge—but apply it.108 On the other hand, if
there is no communicative content, there is no legal content: for conventionalism,
there is no law apart from the communicative content derived from authoritative
sources.109 Here is, again, where discretion comes in. This, as I will expand upon
later, has important implications—and marks an important difference with
formalism—in the treatment of hard cases.
B. Pragmatism
Pragmatism as a theory of adjudication (which is not necessarily connected to
philosophical pragmatism)110 claims that judges ought to come up with optimal
decisions, all-things-considered, without regard to consistency with past decisions,
as an end in itself.111 The pragmatic judge does see legal materials, as Posner argues,
as potentially valuable sources of information.112 Thus, pragmatism does not entirely
ignore legal constraints. From a pragmatist perspective, moreover, judges ought to
consider the systemic consequences of their decisions,113 and take into account the
values of continuity, coherence, impartiality, and predictability—but as values
always open for tradeoffs.114 Thus, because of the evident beneficial consequences
of rules, a pragmatic judge should sometimes decide cases quickly, on the basis of
legal materials’ plain meaning.115 But this is always for each judge to decide on her
own. When deciding a case, the judge must try to compare the benefits of adherence
to legal materials to the costs of failing to innovate when the decisions recommended
by the legal materials are inadequate.116 Posner’s suggestion about how to strike this
balance is telling: “make the most reasonable decision you can, all things
considered.”117
In terms of the key features of formalism that I identified above, pragmatism
decidedly rejects all of them. Its rejection is not an absolute one, since pragmatism
might recommend deciding some cases using formalist techniques, and hence
108

Thus, according to conventionalism, “the primary way in which law is determined
is that the linguistic content of a legally authoritative pronouncement becomes a legal norm
simply because it was authoritatively pronounced.” Greenberg, supra note 82, at 54.
109
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 116–17.
110
Matthew H. Kramer, The Philosopher-Judge: Some Friendly Criticisms of Richard
Posner’s Jurisprudence, 59 MOD. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (1996).
111
Posner, supra note 24, at 238.
112
See id.
113
RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59 (2003) [hereinafter
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY].
114
Id. at 60–61.
115
Id. at 62–63.
116
See id. at 63–64. In this aspect, pragmatism advocates something along the lines of
what Alexander and Sherwin call a “natural model” of decision-making. See ALEXANDER &
SHERWIN, supra note 97, at 39.
117
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 113, at 64.
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adhering to those features. However, this can only be decided case-by-case by the
pragmatist judge. For instance, a pragmatic judge might recognize that legal doctrine
plays a relevant role in generating expectations and facilitating commerce.118 But
her deference to doctrine is not decided ex ante and across the board, as formalism
suggests, but in each particular case. In fact, as Posner’s own recent characterization
of his work as a judge shows, a much cruder approach to adjudication, under which
legal materials provide few constraints, might be compatible with pragmatism.119
C. Interpretivism
Interpretivism defends several claims about the role of judges. For example,
interpretivism claims that, when adjudicating, judges must have at least an implicit
theory about the point of legal practice as a whole, about the goal or principle that
best justifies it.120 Additionally, according to interpretivism, the correct underlying
theory is that legal practice secures a form of equality among citizens and morally
justifies the exercise of political power. This general purpose of law leads to the
view that the legal rights and obligations of parties follow not just from authoritative
sources, but also from the moral and political principles presupposed by those
sources as their best possible justification.121
The adjudicative approach advocated by interpretivism has three steps. First,
the judge identifies a set of legal materials that might apply to the case at hand.122
Second, she must construct a justification that fits most of those legal materials and
shows them in their best light, as expressing a coherent conception of justice.123
Third, she must adjust her pre-interpretive view considering that justification,
discarding some of the presumptively applicable materials as “mistake[s].”124
Judges, under this view, enforce the rights of citizens as they flow from past political
decisions and their best justification. Adjudicative decisions are, figuratively
speaking, a part of a long novel written by different authors.125 The best justification
of the previous chapters determines whether a proposition of law is true or false.126
In summarized terms, judges ought to decide cases in ways which are consistent
118

Id. at 95.
“‘I pay very little attention to legal rules, statutes, constitutional provisions,’ Judge
Posner said. ‘A case is just a dispute. The first thing you do is ask yourself—forget about the
law—what is a sensible resolution of this dispute?’” Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with
Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posner-retirement.html [https://perma.cc/Q96UG3HH].
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DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 98, at 87–88.
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Id. at 95–96.
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Id. at 65–66.
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Id. at 66.
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Id.
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Id. at 228–32.
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See id. at 225–26.
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with the principles that morally justify legal practices. These principles allow for the
resolution of hard cases.
In terms of the key features of formalism, interpretivism accepts complex
versions of some of them and rejects others. Generally, under interpretivism,
interpretation is connected to large issues of moral and political theory that transcend
the relationship between the parties and the limited domain of contract law.
Retrospectivity is relevant for interpretivism, in its account of the relevance of past
political decisions.127 Interpretivism rejects rule-boundedness because it places a big
emphasis on principles of political morality. It also rejects decisional restriction,
since judges ought to decide cases based on eminently normative considerations.
Regarding doctrinalism, the taxonomies and classifications of legal doctrine are, for
interpretivism, a matter of local priority. Thus, they might be relevant if they track
the right moral principles, but the judge might suggest their modification when this
is what best coheres with the justification of legal practice.128 Finally, interpretivism
rejects nuanced literalism, since the best interpretation of legal practices might
recommend deciding in ways which are inconsistent with the limitedly enriched
literal meaning of legal texts.
However, the most important divergence between interpretivism and formalism
is connected to their treatment of hard cases. I turn to this issue in the next part.
V. HARD CASES AND DEVELOPING THE LAW
Judges, particularly in common law systems, change the law while applying
it.129 Sometimes, they go beyond the texts of legal materials, generating new
solutions to hard cases, developing the law by adapting it to changing circumstances.
These innovations may expand or contract the presumptive scope of application of
legal materials,130 as a means to achieve adequate outcomes in legal adjudication.
Formalism is not just a theory about easy cases, and it has the resources to guide
judicial development in hard cases—without endorsing judicial legislation.131 On the
contrary, under formalism, the development of law might still count as applying the
law.132
127

Id. at 227–28.
See id. at 250–54 (describing the doctrinal compartmentalization of law).
129
See Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588, 588–89 (Jules Coleman & Scott J.
Shapiro eds., 2002); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 112–17 (2009).
130
MATTHIAS KLATT, MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT: THE NORMATIVITY OF LEGAL
ARGUMENTATION 5 (2008).
131
See id. at 4–15 (discussing the contrast between judicial legislation and judicial
development, highlighted by the German doctrine of the wording of the statute).
132
Despite the talk of “applying the law” that will characterize a lot of this part of my
argument, what I mean by this expression is just the idea of applying the pre-existing legal
materials. This is consistent, as I have said above, with an eliminativist or one-system
jurisprudential view.
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It is important to note that, for some cases to be hard, there must be a significant
proportion of easy cases (i.e., cases that can be solved by adjudicators by simply
applying the semantic content of the relevant legal materials and their related
doctrines). The distinction between hard and easy cases depends on acknowledging
the existence of both types.133 Arguably, easy cases constitute the core of contract
law adjudication. Of course, it is easy to understand why legal theorists tend to focus
on hard cases decided by appellate courts. But, pace Dworkin, hard cases are not the
most common instance.134 Still, any plausible theory of adjudication should be able
to account for hard cases, even if they are not as important or common as they
sometimes seem.
There are two ways in which a case might be hard. First, it may be unclear what
the communicative content of a legal rule is, either because the relevant legal
materials are semantically obscure, or because they simply remain silent on the case
at hand. Second, it might be that the communicative content is clear, but its
application to the case at hand is inconsistent with the purposes of contract law.135
In the first case, adjudicative institutions need to make a decision even though there
is no clear answer provided by legal materials; in the second, there is a clear answer,
but the answer is inadequate. I call the first type of case a semantically hard case,
and the second type a normatively hard case.136 Thus, we can build the following
scheme of hard cases:
Semantically
Hard Cases
Unclear Answer
No Answer

Normatively Hard
Cases
Unacceptable
Answer

In a case of Unclear Answer, it is uncertain what the communicative content
derived from legal materials is. This might be because of the unclear meaning of an
expression or its vagueness,137 or because legal materials contain different
propositions with inconsistent implications. In a case of No Answer, there is simply
no proposition in the legal materials that is applicable to the case at hand. Finally, in
the case of Unacceptable Answer, there is no question about the semantic content,
133

In all of this, of course, I am presupposing that rules are semantically autonomous
from their underlying justifications. Otherwise, there could not be any possible conflict
between the rule and its justification. (All cases would be easy.) See ANDREI MARMOR,
INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 153 (2d ed., Hart Pub. 2005); see also Ángeles
Ródenas, En La Penumbra: Indeterminación, Derrotabilidad y Aplicación Judicial de
Normas, 24 DOXA 63, 72–73 (2001) (Spain).
134
See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 31, at 407.
135
See Manuel Atienza & Juan Ruiz Manero, Rules, Principles, and Defeasibility, in
THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 238, 243 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista
Ratti eds., 2012); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 179.
136
For a similar taxonomy, see Stone, supra note 1, at 179.
137
See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 31, at 405–06.
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but the application of that semantic content to the case is normatively
unacceptable. 138
Legal principles are the main mechanism that formalism proposes to address
these cases. This mechanism is connected to the doctrinalist perspective of
formalism and allows judges to apply legal materials beyond their literal scope, or
to avoid the application of prima facie applicable materials to a particular case. One
might say, following Savigny, that in the first case, communicative content is simply
indefinite, and legal principles determine and refine that relatively inchoate meaning
into determinate legal content, and that, in the second, the communicative content is
definite but erroneous because it diverges from “the actual thought of the law.”139 In
the latter case, legal principles correct the communicative content for the purpose of
constructing legal content.
The notion of the actual thought of the law as a guiding (albeit metaphorical)
criterion shows that a judge can admit the existence of normatively hard cases and
the need to solve them satisfactorily without endorsing discretion or ceasing to apply
the law. Indeed, the same reasons that might lead to an insistence on a rule-bound
approach to adjudication would continue to exist in hard cases. Once the legal
materials run out, or we are persuaded that their application provides an evidently
inadequate answer, there is no transformation in the role that judges ought to have.
It is not the case that, beyond legal materials, the judge is left with nothing but
“policy.”140 Hard cases should not lead to an abandonment of the commitments that
underlie the adjudication of easy cases. If there are good reasons for formalism in
the routine operation of contract law adjudication, those reasons subsist in hard
cases.
Still, hard cases do require a certain movement beyond legal materials and
towards normative foundations. Precisely, under formalism, legal principles play a
mediating function between legal materials and their underlying instrumental
justification. In this way, they allow for deciding hard cases taking into account their
peculiarity, but consistently with the rest of the theory of adjudication. Importantly,
these principles are legal principles—not in the theoretically ambitious sense that
they are “part of the law,” but in the more mundane sense that they are connected to
pre-existing legal materials.
The use of the term legal is also important because it highlights a distinction
between formalism and Dworkin’s interpretivism. Interpretivism also uses
principles as means to address hard cases.141 Under formalism, however, even
though legal principles relate to the underlying justifications of contract law,142 they

138

Id. at 415–16.
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 179, 186
(William Holloway trans.) (1867).
140
Stone, supra note 1, at 192.
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See DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 81.
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See EISENBERG, supra note 50, at 80.
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are not coextensive with them. They are internal or mid-level principles143 that don’t
justify contract law, but rather are themselves justified by the underlying purposes
of the practice, occupying a middle ground between the latter and authoritative legal
materials. For instance, the principle of good faith, which has been understood as
implicit in Article 1134 of the French Code Civil and has been recognized in
American law by the Restatement,144 can be appealed to directly by a judge in order
to adjudicate a hard case. However, good faith is not a consideration that justifies
the whole practice of contract law, but a principle that is internal to the practice and
simultaneously mediates between the internal discourse of contract doctrine and the
instrumental purposes that underlie it.145 The formalist conception of legal principles
is thus similar to the notion of regulae iuris (i.e., of statements or maxims that
systematize parts of the legal system).146 These principles are implicit in legal
materials, and are not a mere matter of substantive justice or social morality; they
are indissolubly connected to authoritative legal sources.147 In contrast, for Dworkin,
a principle “is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of
morality.”148 While Dworkinian principles are most naturally understood as
wholesale, foundational principles of political morality, formalist principles are
internal, mid-level, and legal.
There is a second crucial difference. Interpretivism understands principles in
opposition to instrumental goals or policies. While principles stand for requirements
of justice or political morality,149 policies stand for the advancement of collective
goals.150 Only the former, and not the latter, should guide adjudication.151 Under
formalism, on the other hand, legal principles mediate between the available legal
materials and their instrumental justifications, and are themselves part of an
instrumental social practice. They are indissolubly connected to policy
considerations (even if they do not coincide with them).
143

Cf. Michael D. Bayles, Mid-Level Principles and Justification, 28 NOMOS 49, 49–
50 (characterizing the notion of mid-level principles); Kenneth Henley, Abstract Principles,
Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law, 12 LAW & PHIL. 121, 122 (1993) (building on
Bayles’s work to argue that “mid-level principles serve to promote the rule of law”).
144
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
145
Here, I follow Fernando Atria, Jurisdicción e Independencia Judicial: El Poder
Judicial Como Poder Nulo, 5 REV. ESTUDIOS DE LA JUSTICIA 119, 120–21 (2004) (Chile);
Fernando L. Atria, La Relevancia Del Derecho Civil (a Propósito de Barros, Tratado de
Responsabilidad Extracontractual), 8 REV. ESTUDIOS DE LA JUSTICIA 219, 225–26 (2006)
(Chile).
146
Manuel Atienza & Juan Ruiz Manero, Sobre Principios y Reglas, 10 DOXA 101, 105
(1991) (Spain). See also PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL
MAXIMS (1966).
147
Id. at 112.; see also Graham Virgo, Doctrinal Legal Research, in THE NEW OXFORD
COMPANION TO LAW 339, 339–40 (Peter Cane & Joanne Conaghan eds., 2008).
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DWORKIN, supra note 42, at 22.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 82.
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Id. at 84.
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How do legal principles operate, according to formalism? First, they expand
the communicative content of existing legal materials to cover new cases, in the
circumstances of No Answer. Second, they guide the construction of the legal
content of legal materials whose communicative content is unclear, in cases of
Unclear Answer. In these two types of situations, in which legal principles operate
similarly to analogies,152 linguistic indeterminacy need not lead to legal
uncertainty.153 Third, legal principles restrict the application of prima facie
applicable legal materials in cases of Unacceptable Answer. In this latter situation,
principles lead to defeasibility (a familiar version of which is distinguishing a
precedent):154 legal norms are subject to implied exceptions which have not been
specified ex ante,155 and which reduce their scope of application.156 In these three
cases, legal principles constitute mechanisms for the construction of legal content in
hard cases.
Legal principles are already present in contemporary legal systems. A basic
interpretive principle in many of them is that every behavior not expressly mandated
or prohibited is allowed.157 While some have seen this standard as a “closure rule”
that shows the inexistence of gaps “when the law is silent,”158 I think it is rather a
principle mediating between rules and considerations of political morality. In any
case, the example is useful because it shows how gaps in the communicative content
of legal materials do not imply that judges should make law.159
There are also examples of legal principles working like this in contract law. I
return to good faith, a general principle recognized by most American
jurisdictions.160 Although good faith has been criticized for its open-ended character,
152

For an analysis of analogy along similar lines, see NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC
206 (2009); see also RAZ, supra
note 104, at 180–209.
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Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1272.
154
See Riccardo Guastini, Defeasibility, Axiological Gaps, and Interpretation, in THE
LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 182, 188 (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti
eds., 2012).
155
Juan Carlos Bayón, Why Is Legal Reasoning Defeasible?, 2 DIRITTO & QUESTIONI
PUBBLICHE 1, 11 (2002) (It.).
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Guastini, supra note 154, at 188.
157
See HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A
TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST EDITION OF THE REINE RECHTSLEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW
85 (1997).
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See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 104, at 75–77.
159
David Lyons, Open Texture and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, 18 LAW &
PHIL. 297, 300–02 (1999).
160
See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 (1980) (noting that most American jurisdictions
recognize the duty to perform in good faith as a general principle); U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (recognizing the obligation of good faith in the
performance and enforcement of all contracts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (same).
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it has been able to accommodate different normative commitments while
maintaining a stable “jural meaning,”161 as a standard of contract interpretation and
an implied covenant in every contract.162 In both cases, good faith acts as an openended placeholder which “serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad
faith.”163 Because of this open-ended character, the principle of good faith needs to
be disciplined, and—as legal principles in general, according to formalism—
specified and articulated into specific criteria of application164 through doctrinal
construction, both by courts and scholars. As Summers has argued, this is precisely
what has happened in the case of good faith.165 As a consequence, judges applying
the principle have meaningful guidance, and they do not simply make new law.166
On the contrary, they are able to effectuate the intention of the parties and protect
their reasonable expectations,167 doing justice “according to law.”168 The principle
of good faith, moreover, when recognized by the Second Restatement, was based on
pre-existing legal materials, such as judicial opinions, statutory developments, and
doctrinal scholarship.169 However, good faith goes beyond these legal materials,
connecting them to the instrumental foundations of contract law, policing
advantage-taking170 and allowing for voluntary cooperation between strangers.171
To contemporary ears, the idea that even when judges develop the law or devise
creative solutions to legal problems—they still resort to pre-existing legal sources—
might sound strange. It certainly contrasts with the commonplace observation that

161

Balganesh & Parchomovsky, supra note 73, at 1246–47.
Burton, supra note 160, at 371.
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Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968).
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See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 820 (1981) (suggesting a need for judges to
“try to articulate criteria to be used to decide whether particular conduct claimed to be in bad
faith really is so”).
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Id. at 822 (explaining how doctrinal and judicial developments have led to the
formulation of more determinate criteria and application contexts for the duty of good faith
the formulation of “lists of criteria” by judges and scholars, and the “accumulation of
experience with respect to some contexts,” are all examples of ways in which “good-faith
law” is becoming fully formed).
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of good faith under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in order to ensure predictability
and uniformity in the application of law).
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170
See Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 272, 275 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014).
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judges legislate interstitially and at least sometimes make law,172 and with the
common ridicule that is usually attached to the ‘declaratory theory of law,’173 which,
in Lord Reid’s words, was nothing but a fairy tale.174
Of course, there is an obvious sense in which judges do make law, all the time.
Sometimes legal materials fail to provide answers. Sometimes they provide unclear
or unacceptable answers. In these cases, judges go beyond those materials. But there
is also an important truth in the notion that, even in such cases, judges “declare the
law.”175 Indeed, the slogan can be seen as a vindication of the incrementalist and
minimalist character of the common law.176
This is not just a change in the language we use to describe what is going on.
Because formalism is committed to doctrinalism, the use of the word declaration is
also the claim that the communicative content of legal materials does not exhaust
the restricted domain of reasons that the judge can consider in making her
decision.177 This helps to explain why formalism places such a big emphasis on
doctrinal construction. Unlike the ‘scarecrow’ versions of formalism we are used to,
the theory of adjudication this Article argues for understands that adjudication
involves much more than the syllogistic application of legal rules or their blind
application despite changing social circumstances. Instead, it admits that
adjudication involves complex processes and should allow for contract law to
develop, claiming nevertheless that this should not mean giving up on legal
formality—and the advantages that, as I will argue, it possesses. Formalism values
legal formality, and its reliance on conceptual stability and doctrinal tradition,
precisely as a means to allow for change “with minimal structural disruption.”178
VI. EXAMPLES
Up to this point, I have set out the main features of formalism and its
commitments, as well as its operation in hard cases. I have also explained how legal
172

As Justice Holmes noted in S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917).
For critical analysis, see generally Allan Beever, The Declaratory Theory of Law,
33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2013) (defining the declaratory theory of law and offering
an argument in its support).
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175
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principles and concepts, such as good faith, play a crucial role in formalist
adjudication. In order to make formalism more concrete, I will focus on a few
examples of decisions that can be interpreted as deploying a formalist approach to
contract law adjudication.
The logical place to start, in my view, is in Cardozo’s contract jurisprudence.
Indeed, as Corbin noted, one of the central components of Cardozo’s genius was his
ability to expand contract doctrine without overthrowing old doctrines and
establishing new ones, striking a balance that allows for the evolution of contract
doctrine without sudden change,179 molding doctrine without repudiating it.180
Consistently with Corbin’s views, modern commentators have characterized
Cardozo’s jurisprudence as a “thickly textured doctrinalism,” which allowed for the
incremental evolution of the common law.181 Cardozo was able to invoke traditional
contract doctrine “to reach legal conclusions that others would have been hard
pressed to see.”182
An obvious example is Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon.183 In this decision,
Cardozo found an implied promise to use reasonable efforts—a “forerunner of what
became the implied duty of good-faith performance.”184 The opinion was an
extraordinary innovation that kept traditional doctrine congruent with contemporary
commercial reality.185 What’s remarkable, from a formalist perspective, is that this
extraordinary innovation was achieved not by imposing an obligation that would
secure whatever goals Cardozo thought underpinned the law of contracts. Instead,
Cardozo interpreted the agreement and its context using the traditional tools of
contract interpretation and old legal standards governing it, such as the notions that
“[a] promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be ‘instinct with an
obligation,’”186 that courts “are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at the
mercy of the other,”187 and that the acceptance of an exclusive agency is an
assumption of duty.188
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See Arthur L. Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 408, 408–09 (1939).
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See id. at 438–39.
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Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1994–1995).
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Id. at 1391.
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118 N.E. 214 (1917).
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Cunningham, supra note 181, at 1397.
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118 N.E. at 214 (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (1909); Moran
v. Standard Oil Co., 105 N.E. 217, 221 (1914)).
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Id. (quoting Hearn v. Charles A. Stevens & Bro., 97 N.Y.S. 566, 570 (1906); Russell
v. Allerton, 15 N.E. 391, 391 (1888)).
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Id. (citing Phoenix Hermetic Co. v. Filtrine Mfg. Co., 150 N.Y.S. 193 (1914); W. G.
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Cardozo’s analysis of consideration and promissory estoppel in Allegheny
College189 is a less well-known but even better example of the doctrinalist balance
between change and tradition. In this decision, Cardozo started his analysis by
claiming that the classical view of consideration as a “detriment to the promisee
sustained by virtue of the promise . . . is little more than a half truth.”190 Cardozo
argued that such half-truths can sometimes perpetuate themselves as whole truths,
as he proceeded to analyze the law governing charitable subscriptions and whether
their enforcement “can be squared with the doctrine of consideration as qualified by
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”191 In his analysis, Cardozo argues:
Decisions which have stood so long, and which are supported by so many
considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save
the symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much
from any reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of
practice and procedure. The concept survives as one of the distinctive
features of our legal system. We have no thought to suggest that it is
obsolete or on the way to be abandoned. As in the case of other concepts,
however, the pressure of exceptions has led to irregularities of form.192
Intelligently, Cardozo maintains a balance between the need to maintain consistency
with the “distinctive features of the legal system” and the very changes and
irregularities of form that those features undergo as a consequence of the legal
system’s need to adapt to new realities and resolve gaps and inconsistencies. The
decision is also noteworthy because Cardozo’s analysis is successful at showing how
this novel type of situation can be adequately dealt with even “within the mould of
consideration as established by tradition.”193
Analyzing this decision, scholars have claimed that the opinion “may be a
perfect example of common law incrementalism,” in which Cardozo works “closely
with the legal concept of consideration.”194 In this way, Allegheny College
“showcases the role that legal concepts play in underwriting the process of
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With this, I do not mean to suggest that Cardozo’s overall approach towards
adjudication was formalist in my sense of the term. His decision in Allegheny College is just
an example of an innovative decision within formalist parameters, even if Cardozo’s overall
jurisprudence takes a different approach. However, I do think there are certain connections
between formalism, and particularly formalism in hard cases, and Cardozo’s understanding
of adjudication. For an overview of that understanding, see generally BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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incremental doctrinal change.”195 In similar terms, Curtis Bridgeman has argued that
the decision is “subtle and insightful,”196 demonstrating a balance between the
technical doctrines of contract law and the relevant factual context of the contractual
relationship—in this case, of charitable subscriptions.197 In this way, Bridgeman
argues, Cardozo was applying formal rules while, at the same time, being attentive
to context and to the nuanced variations that are possible within doctrinal
conceptualism.198
These features of the Allegheny College decision, along with Wood v. Lucy, are
an example of Cardozo’s broader jurisprudence, which—while not, strictly
speaking, formalist—was both innovative and traditional.199 Richard Posner, in his
book on Cardozo, sometimes claims this was a form of concealment.200 At other
times, however, he notes that Cardozo’s balanced jurisprudence was an outstanding
example of common law incrementalism.201 Others, like John Goldberg, claim that
Cardozo was a sophisticated doctrinalist judge, and one of the most accomplished
anti-Realist judges of the twentieth century.202 In my view, there is no need to
adjudicate this dispute one way or the other: the very dispute shows that, in different
senses, it might very well be the case that Cardozo, at least in Allegheny College,
was both creating law (since, for him, after all, judge-made law was one of “the
existing realities of life”)203 and applying it—that he was innovating intelligently
and with close attention to practical consequences, while making use of the resources
available in the legal culture and the pre-existing legal materials. And this duality is
exactly what formalism argues for in hard cases.
Thus, formalism admits the existence of interstitial law-making authority.
Moreover, it accepts that in some instances—in hard cases—the exercise of such
authority is desirable. At the same time, however, formalism stands for the
proposition that, even in such cases, judges should decide by applying “ascertained
legal principles . . . according to a standard of reasoning which is not personal to the
judges themselves,” under the assumption “that there exists a definite system of
accepted knowledge or thought and that judgments and other legal writings are
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evidence of its content.”204 In this way, formalism is based on a relevant distinction
between extending the application of doctrinal principles, developing the law to
adjust to new realities or to avoid undesirable results, and abandoning the limited
domain of legal reasons in a pursuit for justice or the instrumental efficacy of
contract law.205 Judges, under formalism, are supposed to justify their decisions by
resorting to a limited domain of reasons, whether that is achieved through nuanced
literalism or through the more creative application of the authorized institutional and
doctrinal tradition.206
VII. FORMALISM, DEFENDED
Now let us turn to the normative argument on behalf of formalism. Some
scholars base formalistic approaches on fidelity to the traditions of the common
law,207 or on the idea of private law as a self-sufficient justificatory structure.208 The
argument I will make, however, is based on the idea that formalism, to be plausible,
should be defended pragmatically rather than on principle, and on the basis of its
consequences.209 I also avoid defending formalism on the basis of claims about the
nature of language, interpretation, or law.210 The argument for formalism that this
Article puts forward depends on the social effects it may have rather than on
conceptual purity.211
But how should one assess the consequences of theories of adjudication? For
the purposes of my argument, I will assume that the best theory of adjudication is
that which achieves, in the long run, the largest proportion of correct decisions (or,
conversely, the fewest and least costly mistaken decisions), at the lowest cost
possible.212 By correct decisions, I mean decisions which, in the aggregate,
maximize the achievement of contract law’s underlying goals. What’s relevant is
not whether the theory achieves the correct decision in each specific case, but
whether the overall result is the best possible balance of correct decisions, incorrect
204
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decisions, and costs—including both operative costs and total costs of mistakes
(which are a function of the number of mistaken decisions and their costs). Thus, the
evaluation is wholesale rather than retail.
This consequence-based approach towards the justification of formalism has a
respectable tradition in contract scholarship.213 Think, for instance, of the work of
Samuel Williston. As Movsesian has argued, Williston’s formalism was not
essentialist, but was rather based on its practical advantages.214 Formalism, for
Williston, promoted simplicity and predictability.215 Like Williston, my argument
starts from the notion that contract law is best justified in terms of instrumental goals.
From this perspective, adjudication should facilitate the attainment of those goals.
Because of this, I offer a general argument showing that the balance of reasons
weighs in favor of formalism in contract law adjudication. This is just a starting point
that needs to be supplemented with further empirical research.216 But the general
case is strong, and it highlights the direction in which such empirical inquiry should
move.217
My claim, in short, is that allowing judges to always ask the question, ‘Is this
application of the legal materials and their doctrinal construction sound in
instrumental terms?’ is not the best path towards the achievement of contract law’s
goals. Instead, such achievement requires a formalist approach based on treating
legal materials as providing serious rules,218 and applying those rules by considering
their semantic content, limitedly enriched by contextual factors, as constructed by
the doctrinal tradition.
Under formalism, adjudicative decisions are not fine-grained judgments that
take into account all the relevant considerations. This means that formalism has
important costs, and that whatever benefits it may help achieve are obtained at the
expense of some sub-optimal decisions. But the implementation of any theory of
adjudication entails tradeoffs.219 In the final analysis, whether one theory of
adjudication is preferable to another depends on their empirical effects. But in the
213
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absence of full empirical evidence, there is a strong general case to be made in favor
of formalism in the adjudication of contractual disputes. Due to the general rejection
and even ridicule of formalism,220 this general presumptive or prima facie case for
its use is valuable, and shows that, while the final word pertains to real-world effects
and empirical evidence, a priori there is no reason to presume formalism would be
undesirable. On the contrary, there are several reasons that provide strong support
for the plausibility of a generally formalistic approach to contract law adjudication.
A. Simplicity, Generalizability, and Reduction of Decision Costs
Tailored and fine-grained decisions may seem ideal at the retail level.
Particularized and detailed attention to the complexities of each case would arguably
be the ideal solution if all that mattered was getting it right in the specific case. But
getting it right in the specific case is not all that matters, particularly if getting it
right demands decisions the content of which cannot be easily communicated. Finegrained approaches to adjudication can present significant communicative costs.221
The decisions achieved through them might not be effective in guiding citizens’
behavior and might increase transaction costs. Formalism may lead to less fine-tuned
decisions at the retail level, but, at the wholesale level, secures the significant
advantages of simplicity and generalizability. The messages generated by formalism
are clear and simple,222 an advantage that is fundamental when communicating legal
standards to large audiences.223
Moreover, formalism might be epistemically less demanding than other
approaches that require more attention to the specific case, such as pragmatism.
Judges are not capable of taking into consideration all the relevant data that an allthings-considered decision procedure would demand to be considered. Formalism
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decreases the costs of adjudicative decisions, and by taking many (otherwise
relevant) considerations off the table, allows decision-makers to focus on a limited
set of relevant considerations in more detail,224 decreasing decisional complexity.225
Of course, simplicity is not all that matters. But the simplicity achieved by
nuanced literalism, together with well-designed legal texts and settled, sound
doctrines, present outstanding benefits. Accuracy is costly.226 Formalism decreases
such costs and, coupled together with reasonably acceptable rules and doctrines, as
seems to be the case in contemporary contract law, is more capable of achieving a
reasonable balance than more particularistic or purposive approaches to
adjudication, such as pragmatism and interpretivism.
But for formalism to reduce decision costs, legal rules must be taken as serious
rules.227 A serious rule “purports to state a prescription applicable to every case that
falls within the rule’s factual predicate or hypothesis.”228 Accordingly, formalism
requires judges to apply rules based on their literal meaning, limitedly enriched, and
as constructed by contract doctrine, without any further consideration into
underlying purposes. The reason for this is that those underlying considerations are
very often concealed, and—if contemporary contract theory is a reliable
indication—their precise identity is unclear. Uncertain conjectures about underlying
values make decision-making more complex and costlier, while providing limited,
if any, benefits. Indeed, by their very nature, conjectures can very well be
substantively mistaken. This is an evident risk with an interpretivist theory of
adjudication.
Moreover, even if we agreed on contract law’s foundations, the very
complexity of private law interactions, and the relevance of stability and reliance in
their development, suggests that the simple legal doctrines and clear-cut rules
generated by a formalist approach may deal with this complexity better than more
ambitious approaches.229 We should not lose track of “the virtue of deciding many
questions up front and across the board,”230 and of the advantages of using blunt and
narrowing devices that cut off access to communicative features that, in other
contexts, might be relevant.231
This simplicity comes at a cost. Following legal rules and doctrines without
consideration of their underlying purposes will sometimes result in morally sub224
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optimal results—for instance, when the lack of a formality prevents the enforcement
of an otherwise legitimate and jointly beneficial bargain. The benefits of formalism,
however, may still outweigh its moral cost.232 More importantly, when the
application of legal materials, literally interpreted and doctrinally constructed, is
clearly inconsistent with any plausible rationale or instrumental value of contract
law, then formalism provides a remedy that can preserve some of the benefits of
rule-boundedness and decisional restriction, but still deal with these hard cases: legal
principles.
B. Institutional Considerations
Deciding on the best theory of adjudication depends on an assessment of
institutional capacities.233 In this aspect, it is generally accepted that judges are illequipped for the complex calculation of the consequences of their decisions.234 They
lack relevant information, and their ability to foresee the consequences of their
decisions is severely limited.235 Moreover, adjudicative decisions are focused on
particular situations and their idiosyncratic characteristics, rather than on the
aggregative analysis of all relevantly similar situations and their shared features. On
the face of these facts, formalism may be the best pragmatic response to the
institutional characteristics of judges and adjudication.236 As Williston once argued,
courts, in contrast to legislatures, lack the appropriate means and perspective to
engage in large-scale institutional design and social experimentation.237
Similarly, Jonathan Morgan has convincingly argued that economic regulation
is beyond the capacity of courts.238 This is particularly relevant from the perspective
of efficiency. As is well-known, law and economics, despite its impressive
development during the past fifty or sixty years, still lacks the resources to deliver
univocal recommendations for contract law.239 If that is the case, then judges, who
typically lack sophisticated economic training, are in a much worse position if we
ask them to devise efficient decisions.240
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This phenomenon is not simply an issue of economic training, however. The
factors contributing to courts’ institutional inadequacy to achieve socially optimal
results are a consequence of the very way in which courts and adjudication are
structured.241 Courts have limited empirical data regarding the possible effects of
their decisions.242 The dispute is framed by the litigants’ submissions.243 And such
disputes are not necessarily a representative sample of the whole cluster of cases to
which the decision might be applicable.244
Because of this, consequentialist reasoning about the attainment of contract
law’s purposes—even if the identification of such purposes were easy and
indisputable—should not be the central concern of adjudication, which seems illequipped to deal with such considerations. Issues of legal interpretation are not just
to be resolved at the substantive level—how should this legal text be interpreted?—
but, more importantly, are to be settled in institutional terms—how should this or
that institution, with its abilities and limitations, apply this legal text?245 Thus, we
shouldn’t be blind to institutional considerations. Of course, a full consideration of
institutional competences is inevitably empirical and situated. But given a few
structural features of adjudication, like the ones I have mentioned, it seems clear that
institutional considerations present a forceful reason favoring formalism. Judges are
appointed because of their legal training and knowledge;246 they should stick to do
what they are trained to do.
C. Reduction of the Risks and Costs of Mistakes
A third reason for formalism is given by the risk of judicial mistakes,247 since,
as Schauer notes, when we allow decision-makers to consider every relevant factor
to reach the best decision in the particular case, they might still fail.248 One need not
endorse the view that courts are radically incompetent when it comes to enforcing
contracts to accept this.249 It is just a matter of human fallibility, combined with some
of the structural features of adjudication I already noted.
The cost of adjudicative mistakes is a function of their number and
magnitude.250 For the purposes of my argument, I will leave aside factual and
empirical mistakes. Also, I will focus exclusively on hard cases, particularly cases
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of Unacceptable Answer, which arguably present the best scenario for more openended and less restrained decision-making procedures than formalism.
Courts could be mistaken on at least three levels when deciding a hard
contractual case. First, courts might be mistaken about the foundational goals of
contract law; second, even if they identify the goals correctly, they might be
mistaken about the supposed contradiction between such goals and the decision
recommended by the formal application of legal rules; third, if the contradiction does
exist, they might be mistaken about how to resolve it.
At the first level, there is simply no agreement regarding the foundations, goals,
and moral justifications underlying contract law. We still lack a generally accepted
theory of contract.251 We also haven’t found a way to adjudicate among these views,
partly because of diverging methodological commitments.252 This entails that (i) it
is quite likely that a judge will be mistaken about the foundational goals of contract
law, and that different judges will hold different and incompatible views about them
(which means that any theory requiring judges to decide on the basis of those
foundations will be unfit to be applied in a coordinated way); and (ii) since the
identification of contract law’s foundations is contested, the identification of which
applications are problematic and which are not will be tainted by the same
disagreement. In terms of several central legal values, such as coherence,
predictability, and treating like cases alike,253 this is a recipe for disaster. On the
contrary, a formalist theory of adjudication may produce adequate results even for a
diversity of foundational theories.254 It might be a sub-optimal alternative when
compared to what any specific judge would consider as the best theory, but it is
optimal as a coordinated solution among different judges.
At a second level, even if we could agree on the foundations of contract law,
the identification of which rule-applications are inconsistent with them is also
subject to significant disagreement. At this second level, the interpretation and
construction of the rule might be mistaken. There could also be a mistake in the
identification of its application as inconsistent with the foundational goals of
contract law. An easy example is the efficiency of contract remedies. Imagine we all
agreed that contract law serves efficiency. Let us assume that a certain jurisdiction
251
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provides specific performance for the breach of a specific type of contract. Under a
pragmatist approach, the rule should be set aside if in a given instance it would be,
all-things-considered, inefficient to grant specific performance. However, the
determination of the most efficient remedy—even at a general level, but particularly
in the specific case—is an extremely complex task, and even legal economists who
have focused a significant part of their academic careers on it have been unable to
reach a clear conclusion.255 Pragmatism would generate significant risks of mistake
if applied to remedial decisions. While a formalistic approach might end up strictly
applying rules that also lead to inefficient outcomes, at least this would have the
benefit of being a consistently predictable, and thus less costly, mistake—and one
which legislatures and regulators, given their greater ability to gather systemic and
aggregate information about large sets of contractual activities, might be better
situated to correct.
At a third level, even ignoring mistakes about foundational goals and about the
inadequacy of rules, judges may be mistaken as to what the best solution would be.
Again, contract remedies give a good example. Let us assume, again, that we all
agree that efficiency is the sole foundational goal of contract law. Let us further
assume that legal economists had a clear view about the inefficiency of specific
performance, but that in a given jurisdiction it is the remedy prescribed by legal
texts. A pragmatist theory of adjudication might recommend setting aside the
specific performance remedy in such cases, based on its inconsistency with
efficiency. However, the efficient remedy is again unclear. It might be expectation
damages, reliance damages, restitution, or any proportion (say, 66% of expectation
damages) or combination of them (say, 50% of expectation damages and 17% of
reliance damages).256 The likelihood of a judge failing to determine the efficient
remedy, again, is extremely high.
This is even more problematic when there is simply no sound empirical
evidence available for judges regarding the likely impact of legal rules and remedies.
We thus need decision protocols that do not depend on this unattainable data.257
Otherwise, if we direct judges to base their decisions on social consequences, we
might end up inviting idiosyncratic or intuitive considerations to take the place of
(unavailable) empirical findings.258 Instead, formalism’s decisional restriction
advocates for a certain caution, narrowness in development, and self-limitation
under uncertainty.259
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D. Predictability, Certainty, and the Protection of Legitimate Expectations
Even if courts were perfect Herculean figures incapable of mistakes,260
formalism still might be preferable because of its predictability, certainty, and the
protection of legitimate expectations, all of which are crucial for contract law’s
valuable effects. Whatever goals and social purposes underlie contract law, they are
not achieved directly, but through the interaction of private individuals. In this
aspect, for contract law to achieve its goals, people need to actually engage in
contracting. At the same time, non-simultaneous exchange requires some form of
assurance that performance will occur. 261 Otherwise, contractual parties are stuck in
a prisoner’s dilemma, in which each party’s incentives push them to defect rather
than to cooperate.262 In order to avoid this dilemma, contract enforcement gives
assurance with regards to the future conduct of contractual parties, deterring
opportunistic behavior.263
For formal contract enforcement to achieve such goals, however, it must be
certain and predictable. This is particularly true for long-term contractual
investments in developed economies and complex markets,264 which require a high
degree of formality.
Formal and general legal concepts, as Williston argued a long time ago,
promote predictability in contractual relationships, while uncertainty is costly,
particularly since the legal system should be able to determine rights and obligations
without resorting to litigation.265 Predictable and clear-cut rules achieve such
delineation without the costs of a more tailored approach. Indeed, for the recipients
of rules, more information is not necessarily better.266 On the contrary, they need to
navigate the complexity of their private interactions, and for such purpose clear-cut
rules may be a crucial mechanism.267 This is particularly true in contract law, in
which predictability about future behavior is essential. A coherent and predictable
body of law allows individuals to plan with confidence, and to settle their disputes
without the need to recur to litigation.268
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Moreover, when serious legal rules are in place and they are applicable, judges
can expect parties to have followed those rules for guidance.269 In the case of contract
law, this means that judges who want to decide predictably ought to apply the rules
as they were found by the parties when planning their affairs and executing their
contracts. Uncertainty may limit the value of contractual instruments as planning
devices, as has been attested by the growing critical literature on the Uniform
Commercial Code’s incorporation strategy.270 On the other hand, through its use of
doctrinal concepts and principles, a formalist approach achieves an equilibrium
between development and stability.
E. Dealing with Value Pluralism
Another reason for formalism in adjudication is given by foundational value
pluralism. Whatever one might say about the normative foundations of contract law,
and even if pluralism is not the correct account of such foundations, as a matter of
descriptive sociology the fact of theoretical pluralism—of people holding diverse,
conflicting, and potentially incommensurable values—in contract theory is.
Despite these conflicting values, judges must decide disputes. One path towards
those decisions could be to try to achieve the best possible judgment by combining
and weighing competing principles, trying to strike the right balance. But this might
lead to ad hoc decisions and inconsistency. One reasonable way to avoid ad hoc
decisions and inconsistency, even if foundations are plural or at least contested, is to
adopt a formalistic approach to adjudication that refuses to take into consideration
such foundations. Formalism avoids these disagreements by refusing to adjudicate
them in order to decide contractual disputes, resorting to formal rules rather than to
foundational principles.271
However, one could acknowledge pluralism and claim, nevertheless, that
adjudication should not ignore underlying values. For instance, Aditi Bagchi has
recently defended a view of contract as imperfect procedural justice, according to
which judges should constantly refer to the normative principles underlying contract
law.272 Bagchi’s claim is that the justification of contract law should inform
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adjudication,273 because contracting is an imperfect means to achieve normative
ends, a mechanism that normally reaches those ends but may nevertheless fail to do
so. Bagchi argues that pluralism and this view of imperfect procedural justice go
easily together, because the odds that a specific set of rules will consistently serve
several distinct goals are low.274
For Bagchi, because contractual exchange is a useful yet imperfect mechanism
for achieving valuable social goals,275 contract law should be understood and
interpreted in terms of those ends. Judges should use evaluative considerations in
the very course of applying the rules of contract law.276 For her, this is in some sense
inevitable, since legal doctrines and rules do not apply themselves, and are
indeterminate regarding case outcomes.277 Values do not simply justify contract law.
They should be invoked and pursued in its everyday operation.278
One possibility Bagchi doesn’t consider is that it might be the case that respect
for the values justifying contract law precisely requires not trying to achieve those
values when adjudicating disputes. For instance, if one thinks that personal
autonomy and efficiency are values underlying contract law, a view which is at least
plausible, we might have good reasons for judges not to read too much of those
normative commitments into authoritative legal texts. If efficiency and autonomy
have anything to do with allowing parties to satisfy their preferences, then a theory
of adjudication that prevents judges from trying to actively achieve efficiency and
autonomy seems at least compelling.279 Respect for autonomy and efficiency might
require a certain deference for parties’ own judgments.
Moreover, the claim that legal materials are indeterminate seems to be an
exaggeration. Indeed, this is untrue at least for judges working in present-day
jurisdictions, given the fact that most of the legal texts for contract law are part of a
larger and settled systematic web of doctrines and legal principles. If one
understands legal norms as including this systemic web—as one should—then the
indeterminacy claim seems much less attractive. Moreover, we might devise
mechanisms, such as internal mid-level principles, that allow us to deal with
indeterminacy when we encounter it, without resorting to foundational values. This,
again, might combine the benefits of serious rules with the normative weight of
foundational values, without falling into unpredictability.
At a deeper level, whatever one can say about the foundations of contract law,
there is today simply no consensus about them. Seeing contract as an imperfect
procedural mechanism might make sense in a world where we agreed on contract’s
foundations. However, in our world, in which we lack such a consensus, things
might work better, to use Rawls’s framework, if we see contract as a case of pure
273
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procedural justice, that is, a case where “there is no independent criterion for the
right result,”280 not because we think there is no right result, but because, given the
fact of theoretical disagreement, the right result never appears in propria persona,
but always “in the form of somebody’s controversial belief.”281
Against this backdrop, formalism allows for incompletely theorized agreements
between people that differ starkly on fundamental values.282 This is extremely
relevant, because a theory of adjudication must be susceptible of application by a
diversity of courts. From this perspective, theories of adjudication solve
coordination problems between adjudicators. As a coordinating solution, formalism
avoids the pitfalls of a “theoretically optimizing but likely self-defeating search for
first-best solutions by multiple decisionmakers with different goals and different
perspectives.”283
F. The Rule of Contract Law and Its Instrumentality: Autonomy and Efficiency
A long tradition sees the rule of law as an instrumental virtue of law, conformity
to which is morally required because it is necessary to allow law to perform its
functions.284 In this part, I will analyze formalism’s instrumental value in terms of
efficiency and personal autonomy, two values that might plausibly underlie contract
law. Regarding these values, formalism presents at least one significant advantage
over other views: it allows parties to set the terms of their interaction, to know where
they stand, and to avoid being subject to the wide range of possible decisions that a
less constrained judge might take.285
The connection between stable rules and personal autonomy makes intuitive
sense. The connection was aptly drawn in Hayek’s discussion of the rule of law,
according to which obedience to general, abstract and prospective rules is not
subjection to someone else’s will.286 Hayek, in my view, was mistaken when he
assumed that the resulting freedom obtained simply as a consequence of the structure
of legal rules. Instead, freedom obtains as a consequence of the adjudicating
institutions’ attitude towards those norms. Formalism provides a way in which such
an attitude can be fostered. But Hayek’s insight about the connection between legal
formality and personal freedom is fundamental. Just as important is Hayek’s view
280
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of contract as one of the legal instruments “that the law supplies to the individual to
shape his own position.”287 This observation remains true only if the individual’s
power to shape his own position is not affected by ex post adjustments to the
applicable legal rules governing such power. If that is the case, then contract law can
effectively work towards securing personal autonomy by establishing a general
framework under which individuals are free to pursue their own projects and
desires.288 Formal contract law provides stability and assurance to interpersonal
relationships, and this allows individuals to “choose styles and forms of life, to fix
long-term goals and effectively direct one’s life towards them.”289
The contribution of formalism to markets and economic efficiency is also easy
to see. The case, again, is made by Hayek. As he argues, allowing individuals to rely
on stable legal frameworks within which they may plan their activities also enables
them “to make the fullest use” of their knowledge.290 Under a formalist approach,
the rules of contract law can thus work as what Sunstein calls privately adaptable
rules, which allocate initial entitlements but maximize private flexibility and
adaptation in achieving ultimate outcomes, minimizing information costs for
governments.291 Again, we must recall that, whatever goal contract law achieves, it
does so through the contractual activities of individuals.
From the perspective of efficiency, moreover, contract law should help parties
maximize their joint gains.292 In recent economic contract theory, Schwartz and
Scott have convincingly argued that there are good efficiency reasons, at least at the
level of contracts between sophisticated parties, for a generally formalistic approach,
combining interpretive approaches such as plain meaning, a hard parol evidence
rule, and the strict enforcement of merger clauses,293 along with a narrow evidentiary
basis.294 This is what sophisticated parties, focused on maximizing their joint gains,
would prefer.
Although there is not nearly enough empirical evidence to conclusively confirm
Schwartz’s and Scott’s theory, there is some empirical evidence available. Lisa
Bernstein has shown in her studies, for instance, that commercial parties in trustbased settings, such as the cotton industry and the New York diamond market, prefer
formalistic adjudication.295 At a wider level, various empirical studies have shown
287

Id. at 154.
F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 76 (2d prtg. 2001).
289
RAZ, supra note 104, at 220.
290
HAYEK, supra note 286, at 156–57; see also F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (arguing that the market as a social institutions
makes better use of a society’s dispersed existing knowledge than a central authoritative
structure).
291
See Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, supra note 282, at 59.
292
Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 27, at 544.
293
Id. at 547.
294
Id. at 569.
295
Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115, 115–117 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private
288

2020]

CONTRACT LAW ADJUDICATION

1165

that parties to international transactions prefer English, New York, and Swiss law,
three relatively formalistic systems of contract law.296 Within the United States,
empirical evidence shows that New York law is the dominant legal framework
chosen by public companies, and that New York is also the preferred forum.297 In
contrast, few parties choose California, an economically significant State with a
contextualist and less formalistic approach to contract adjudication.298 Moreover, as
any practicing transactional lawyer can attest, commercial parties often ask courts,
in their contracts, to ignore prior negotiations, oral discussions, and course of
conduct, and to limit their analysis to the ‘four corners’ of the contract.299 Assuming
that parties want to maximize their joint gains, and considering that these clauses are
negotiated ex ante, such clauses “likely represent efforts by the contracting parties
to maximize the joint value of the undertaking.”300 This means: formalistic devices
increase the joint value of contractual transactions and are thus more efficient.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is a strong general case to make for what I have called formalism as the
right approach to the adjudication of contractual disputes. The claim is strongest
when formalism is compared to pragmatism. In this part, however, I make some
closing suggestions as to why formalism might be generally preferable when
compared to other possible theories as well (such as interpretivism and
conventionalism), admitting, again, that these arguments are general, and would
need to be supplemented with further empirical evidence.
In hard cases, conventionalism’s response, as we have seen, is discretion.
Admittedly, Raz and others have argued that discretion is still constrained by law.301
But they never explain just how those constraints work. Instead, formalism argues
for internal, doctrinal, mid-level principles. Adjudicating these cases through
internal principles rather than resorting to discretion is normatively preferable for
two reasons. The first is the problem of human fallibility and the risks of mistakes
analyzed above, especially since we are dealing with power-conferring social
institutions (whose use by individuals cannot be controlled nor predicted). The
second reason is given by the protection of the practice of contracting and the
expectations fostered by it; any deviation from the rules, even when their application
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could lead to sub-optimal results, can affect the stability of expectations and the
practice of contracting. Again, this does not mean that judges should deny or ignore
the existence of hard cases. But it does counsel for a more formalistic approach
towards these situations than engaging in all-things-considered discretional
decisions, or in the indeterminately constrained discretion proposed by
conventionalism.
What about interpretivism’s Herculean principles? It might seem that, unlike
pragmatism and conventionalism, interpretivism provides a good mechanism for
dealing with hard cases. However, the empirical demandingness of all-thingsconsidered calculations and pragmatic consequentialist considerations finds a
parallel in the normative demandingness of the task that Dworkin entrusts to
adjudicators.302 Hercules is Hercules precisely because he is unlike any judge we
know of. Judges are constrained by time and resources, and might not be able to
engage with large issues of political morality. Moreover, both personal autonomy
and social equality might be hurt by Herculean judges, willing to engage into deeply
contested and uncertain issues of political morality in order to solve contractual
disputes. In these circumstances, the best theory of adjudication might be one that
recommends modesty and decisions based on less abstract principles operating at a
lower level of generality.303
In his early critique of Hartian positivism, Dworkin expressed his
dissatisfaction with what he saw as Hart’s all too quick embrace of discretion in
cases that went beyond the core of pre-existing legal rules, which also led to the
admission that judges decide cases by making retroactive law.304 However, the
problem with Dworkinian principles is that they are unable to avoid the problem of
ex post facto lawmaking. Under formalism, when judges recognize new rights,
remedies, or defenses by applying a principle, they do so by connecting their
innovation to already existing authoritative legal materials that are part of the
relevant legal tradition.305 They attempt to show that, in an important sense, they are
part of those materials, rightly understood.306 While Dworkin incorporates attempts
to achieve something similar through the desideratum that principles should fit the
legal materials,307 his principles are still broad principles of political morality:
“principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process.”308 Interpretivism asks
302
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the judge to decide hard cases by testing whether her interpretation could form part
of a coherent political theory,309 and shows the legal record as the morally best it can
be.310 In contrast, formalism’s legal principles are mid-level. They operate at a lower
level of abstraction than principles of substantive political morality. They are
doctrinal, not political. They are elaborations of contract doctrine, conceptual
devices built and developed by the legal tradition—and, particularly, by prior
scholars, judges, and jurists. Turning Dworkin’s metaphor upside down, one could
thus say: formalism advocates for a catholic, rather than a protestant, jurisprudence.
With this, I mean that while Dworkinian principles are substantive principles of
political morality that “each citizen has a responsibility to identify,”311 formalist
legal principles are doctrinal, technical, and thus are not directly identified by private
citizens, but rather reach those citizens as mediated by an authoritative legal
tradition. As such, they avoid, in a way in which Dworkinian principles do not,
retroactive law-making.
Formalism does not suggest that judges should completely ignore the issue of
the political and moral foundations of contract law. After all, the whole basis of the
theory of adjudication is that it best achieves contract law’s foundational goals. But
they should address cases modestly, either by applying the limitedly enriched
semantic content of legal texts and resorting to their settled doctrinal construction,
or, when this is not possible, by applying mid-level legal doctrinal principles.
Finally, since formalism avoids grand changes and reorientations of prior
jurisprudence, it also decreases the magnitude and costs of mistakes when they
happen.312 In this, formalism and its insistence on mid-level principles are more
consistent with rule of law values like predictability than are abstract Dworkinian
principles.313 Mid-level principles are less unpredictable than large-scale
foundational ones, and in their consistent and disciplined application they decrease
legal indeterminacy.314 Mid-level principles are more consistent, in the end, with all
the values traditionally associated with the rule of law, than Dworkinian principles
of substantive political morality. While we can and do disagree about whether
freedom or social equality are more important, or about whether a particular rule
serves equality or hinders it, it is harder to disagree about the principle of good faith.
Thus, resolving disputes on the basis of principles like the latter achieves greater
predictability than resolving them on the basis of grand and abstract political values.
For these reasons, there is a strong general case in favor of a formalist approach
to contract law adjudication. While a final assessment of the comparative advantages
of different theories of adjudication turns on empirical facts, I have argued that, in
the absence of such evidence, we should resist the call for more open-ended,
particularistic, or politically ambitious theories. Formalism, with its decisional
309
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restriction, incremental development, and rule-bound character, is at least prima
facie preferable—which means that instrumentalists and non-instrumentalists might
end up agreeing, to some extent, at the level of adjudication.

